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ABSTRACT
The impact of global patent regulation in the form of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement has
far reaching effects for the research based pharmaceutical industry and global public
health This paper explores the role of accounting in reinforcing the primacy of capital
interests over global public interest by its ability to capture and measure an abstraction knowledge. This commodification of knowledge serves to transfer the responsibility of
the global health agenda to the market. However, this market based solution is not
sensitive to many important issues faced by governments in relation to the global
pharmaceutical research and development agenda, such as ‘neglected diseases’. The
terms and global nature of the TRIPS Agreement effectively constrains the ability of
governments, particularly in least-developed countries, to address their individual public
health issues. The adoption of TRIPS presents significant challenges and opportunities in
an era of globalisation for both the pharmaceutical industry and policymakers.
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The relentless march of intellectual property rights needs to be stopped
and questioned. Developments in the new technologies are running far
ahead of the ethical, legal, regulatory and policy frameworks needed to
govern their use. More understanding is needed – in every country – of
the economic and social consequences of the TRIPs Agreement (UNDP
Human Development Report 1999)

Introduction
Innovative drug treatments have offered cures from illnesses previously considered lifethreatening, have improved lifestyles and diminished the effects of ageing on those
fortunate enough to be able to afford treatment. In a time when international trade
liberalisation is seen as a panacea for economic underdevelopment, The World Trade
Organization (WTO) through the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement has constrained the ability of developing and least-developed
countries1 to address domestic public health issues by limiting their access to affordable
drugs.

The TRIPS Agreement affords drug companies’ exclusive patent rights on
pharmaceutical innovation for 20 years, but limits the ability of developing and leastdeveloped countries (LDC) to determine their national health issues (diseases) that allow
for the import, production and marketing of low cost copies of patented medicines
(generic drugs). Safeguards within the agreement that allow for compulsory licensing and
parallel importing have not stopped the US Government threatening trade sanctions or

1

The implications of the antimony, developing/less developing or undeveloped, is not stated but these
terms are used in this paper as they are consistent with the literature. The TRIPS Agreement differentiates
between developed, developing and least-developed countries in terms of their respective economies.
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initiating WTO disputes against countries where domestic legislation has been less
protective towards pharmaceutical companies (Oxfam, 2001).

Underpinned by the ideology of neo-liberalism, incorporating free-market globalisation
and trade-led development, the WTO through the TRIPS agreement provides a
mechanism for companies to make monopolistic profits for a guaranteed time frame. In
the case of the research based pharmaceutical industry, companies are granted intellectual
property rights over certain pharmaceutical products. From an agency perspective, there
is an expectation that the industry, in pursuit of profit, will provide social welfare
outcomes as positive externalities through innovation. This suggests that the public
interest in terms of global public health, can be served through market based solutions.
The position taken by pharmaceutical companies is based on the economic rationalist
argument of research and development cost recovery which requires support from patent
protection. However this view, and the expensive lobbying to gain political sway by the
pharmaceutical industry, ignores the real and present public health problems faced by
developing and LDCs. In an era of economic globalisation, ease of technology and
information transfer, patent protection underpins corporate profitability in a competitive
global environment. As the economic power of global corporations increases, so to does
their political and intellectual reach.

“[T]he complex interdependencies between the economic, social, political, and rhetorical
patterns … place accounting in a milieu of concrete, material conditions of human life
where acts of power and acts of exclusion (victimization) are contemporaneous”
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(Arrington, 1990, p.5). Accounting in this context is a device which serves the vested
interests of powerful groups. In the case of pharmaceutical innovation the accounting
discourse of costing and profitability has reoriented a means-end rationality to an endsmean rationality. Instead of an ex ante expectation, justification of patent protection relies
on ex post calculations and legitimation. The quoted ’cost’ of bringing a new drug to
market is US$802 million (DiMasi et al, 2003). “[T]he elegance of a single figure
provides a legitimacy that, at least in certain Western societies, seems difficult to disrupt
or disturb” (Miller, 1994, p.3). Economic justifications for patent protection using
accounting techniques prevail. In practice, accounting techniques define, measure and
value abstractions, identified as intangibles. In this way, accounting facilitates the
commodification of knowledge through the ability to ‘account for’ intangible assets that
subsequently provide a conduit or “gateway to capital” (Drahos, 1996). The perception of
accounting as an objective neutral device subtly reinforces the dominance of capital over
social welfare issues. The ideological hegemony of free market trade liberalisation affects
the process of what is accounted and how, which has been demonstrated to impact on
local communities (Cooper et al, 2003).

The TRIPS Agreement highlights the tensions between the interests of various
governments, powerful multinational corporations and the ‘public interest’, as well as the
role of multilateral organisations in mediating these issues In order to explore these
themes this paper is structured as follows: first we provide an overview of intellectual
property rights and examine the interests of various dominant players and their position
in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. This will be followed by a discussion of the
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inequities presented by the adoption of the Agreement, particularly in relation to health
issues faced by developing and LDCs.

Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property (IP) is a property right in an abstract object. Examples include
copyright, trademarks and patents which serve to mediate property relationships between
individuals by objectifying an intangible. In developing a philosophical understanding of
IP, Drahos (1996, p.1) concluded that, a “property form that allows private hands to
capture important abstract objects creates, among other things, many person dependent
relationships in a society. It swells the growth of private power”.

Intellectual property rights (IPR) are a distinctive form of power and the exclusive nature
of these rights allows dominion or sovereignty over an abstraction - knowledge. This
right should be termed and treated as a privilege and the holders of that privilege
subsequently have duties to society (Drahos, 1996). The rationale for IPR largely rests
with the economic argument that individuals, as self-maximisers, will only devote
resources to the creation of abstract objects if there is a suitable incentive or reward. IPR
allow for monopolistic pricing. This incentive has the expected outcome of generating
creativity, knowledge and innovation. The subsequent diffusion of this knowledge is
reliant on market based mechanisms, which may fail.

Patents, as a form of intellectual property, protect inventions that satisfy the criteria of
novelty and inventiveness for a limited duration (Drahos, 1996). Originally, patent law
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clearly distinguished between discovery and invention. Discoveries were revealed
knowledge compared to the creativity and originality involved in an invention. This
dichotomy has been somewhat blurred with the rulings on patent rights in biological
material (including genes) (Drahos, 1996). The indefinite nature of abstract objects lends
this role of defining the criteria to interested actors and players. Accounting facilitates the
quantification of qualitatitive characteristics. By objectifying knowledge as an intangible
asset, it is defined in such a way that a number represents a concept. Once defined and
counted “differing or distinguishing attributes are no longer visible” (Robson, 1992,
p.688). In the case of pharmaceuticals, there are two intangibles, patents and research and
development costs (capitalised or expensed). In both cases the investment consists of
information or knowledge generated about a drug’s safety and effectiveness rather than
the physical properties of the compound (Kuhlik, 2004). Costing, or the ascription of
numbers to these concepts, is used as a legitimation for the high price of on-patent drugs.

In an emergent global environment dominated by multinational corporations the power
attached to IPR is mediated through multilateral organisations, supported by governments
with vastly differing interests. In relation to public health, the WTO’s introduction of the
TRIPS Agreement has further highlighted issues of power, the inequities exacerbated by
the conferral of IPR and the contested domain in which they exist.
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WTO and TRIPs
The WTO, the primary rule-making body for international trade, is premised on a notion
that if developed, developing and LDC’s co-operate and equitably share in economic
expansion, a prosperous world economy will result (Jawara & Kwa, 2004). Consistent
with this view, the articulated primary purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is
..to reduce distortion and impediments to trade, and taking into account the
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property
rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade
(Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement).
The TRIPS Agreement, negotiated during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, is seen as having equal status as trade in goods covered by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the trade in services covered by the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). These three agreements have been described as
the three pillars of the WTO (Otten and Wager, 1996). These agreements are binding on
all WTO Member States. The TRIPS Agreement aims to set minimum standards in
intellectual property protection. The application of the Agreement requires Member
States to modify domestic laws for consistency with the standards.

Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, patent protection, especially in developing and LDCs,
was perceived as inconsistent or non-existent. Where patent protection did exist, in many
cases, the regimes varied in relation to domestically produced or imported pharmaceutical
drugs. TRIPS has sought to overcome this issue by mandating a term of patent protection
of 20 years, as well as requiring Member States to make patents available for domestic
pharmaceutical inventions. Recognising the economic inequalities amongst Member
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States, the Agreement sets out a staggered time-frame for compliance. Originally,
developed countries were required to comply by 1996, developing countries by 2000 and
least-developed by 2006. In 2001 at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha (Doha
Declaration) the implementation regime was extended and some of the provisions were
clarified. LDCs now have until 2016 to comply with TRIPS. The Doha Declaration also
affirmed sovereign rights to protect public health. The flexibility of some of these
provisions was codified allowing for generic drug manufacture, under special provisions,
through the granting of compulsory licenses and parallel importing (Correa, 2002).

The TRIPS Agreement reflects the changing nature of society and the increasing
importance of technological innovation and globalisation. This ideological stance is
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement under Article 7 through aspirational statements in the
text such as
…[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
The assumption that free market globalisation and harmonisation of laws ultimately serve
to solve social issues is problematic. As studies of globalisation have demonstrated,
facilitating capital or information flows to stimulate economic growth does not
necessarily result in mutual benefits between and within nations (Cooper et al, 2003). The
public interest, as such, is not served unanimously by market based solutions relying on
economic incentives. Nor is it served by a multilateral organisation that is antidemocratic and prioritises corporate profits over social objectives (Jawara & Kwa, 2004).
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Although member states appear to be equal – one nation one vote – meetings are often
held with only a small group of members. Committees filter out interested decision
makers and skew the outcomes in favour of the vested interests of the powerful. As with
TRIPS, initial negotiations did not include most pharmaceutical importer nations, some
states were misinformed and most nations were threatened by US trade power (Drahos &
Braithwaite, 2004). “TRIPS had all the transparency of a one-way mirror, with only the
US and EC knowing exactly what was going on” (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2004, p. 29).

The TRIPS Agreement has profound implications for the research based pharmaceutical
industry, that will benefit from increased global patent protection; the manufacturers and
consumers of generic medicines, whose future is uncertain under the TRIPS Agreement;
and governments, who are charged with the responsibility to adopt TRIPS as well as
meeting the economic and public health objectives of their nations.

The Pharmaceutical Industry
The research based pharmaceutical industry has frequently been criticised over a number
of issues, especially concerning pricing and profitability (Scherer, 2001). In 2002 the
world drug market was valued at US$406 billion, of which 20% was attributable to the
developing world, and the proportion in LDCs much less (Commission on IPR, 2002).
Differential pricing, bio-piracy, the nature of clinical testing and ‘evergreening’2 practices
have all attracted less than favourable attention to the industry.

2

Evergreening is the practice of making minor improvements to existing drugs and re-patenting to extend
the advantages of monopoly pricing (Anon., 2002).
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The debate surrounding the global extension of IPR through TRIPS has seen the
pharmaceutical industry emerge as one of the main lobbyists (Commission on IPR,
2002).

The global, research based pharmaceutical industry is represented by the

International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), a nonprofit, non-government organisation. This association represents 60 companies (IFPMA,
2004) and is a strong and powerful lobby group. In the US, where the majority of
research based companies are located (see Appendix 1), PhRMA represents the leading
research based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and is rather disparagingly
referred to as ‘Big Pharma’ by its critics. In terms of corporate social responsibility and
philanthropy, the industry lobby group directs these critics to the “estimated $2.7 billion
in financial assistance and donated medicines” provided since 1998 by the major
pharmaceutical companies (IFPMA, 2003). The issue of donated medicines is
controversial. Research has demonstrated that these medicines are not ‘free’ and activists
argue that it hampers country specific solutions. In the long-term, donations are neither
sustainable solutions, nor entirely appropriate (Health Action International, 2003).
Misuse of pharmaceuticals, whether through weak healthcare systems or overuse
facilitates drug resistance and long-term problems in the provision of healthcare (Kremer,
2002).

The emergence of multinational corporations as dominant players in global
pharmaceutical markets has led to standardisation and an accentuation of inequalities
(Merson, 2000). In many cases, corporations use IPR and licensing agreements to
disguise the structuring of a global knowledge cartel to effectively dominate markets
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rather than being controlled by them. (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2004). The scale of
investment required for innovation and research has resulted in the concentration and
centralisation of research teams in the applied market (Merson, 2000).3 The
pharmaceutical industry estimates that R&D for each new product, which includes
product failure and opportunity costs, is US$802 million or about 30% of the total cost.
Manufacturing costs on the other hand are relatively small. This production cost means
that generic drugs can be manufactured and priced well below drugs under patent. The
long time-frame of patented drugs and market exclusivity is rationalised by the need to
cover the costs of research and development including the risk of product failure (Kettler
& Collins, 2002).

Why do developing countries object so strongly to TRIPS? Its essential flaw
is to oblige all countries, rich and poor, to grant at least 20 years’ patent
protection for new medicines, thereby delaying production of the inexpensive
generic substitutes upon which developing country health services and poor
people depend. And there is no upside: the increased profits harvested by
international drug firms from developing-world markets will not be ploughed
back into extra research into poor people’s diseases – a fact some companies
will in private admit (OXFAM in Commission on IPR, 2002).
The underlying assumption that strong IPR encourage innovation is the rationale for the
implementation of the global protection offered by TRIPS. For developing nations this is
manifested in the belief that fostering IP will encourage foreign direct investment,
technology transfer and inputs necessary for R&D capacity (Kettler & Collins, 2002).
This potential may be realised in the large, industrialised countries with extant
technological and manufacturing capabilities e.g. Brazil and India. Notwithstanding the
3

Of the 284 approved medicines in the nineties in the US, 93% originated from the private sector. The
estimate of total R&D expenditure by the pharmaceutical industry exceeded US$4.5 billion in 2002
(IFPMA, 2004) (see Appendix 2).
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required investment, companies in these countries would also “need to move along a
steep and rapidly evolving learning curve” (Kettler & Modi in Kettler & Collins, 2002,
p.22). However, even given R&D potential and capabilities, research would probably be
directed toward commercially viable products treating rapidly developing global diseases.

Public Health Issues
Global IPR in pharmaceutical products are conferred to promote improved public health
outcomes in the short and long-term, whether through improved accessibility or trade-led
development. Therefore an important issue for analysis is whether the objective of global
improved public health is being met. There is a prevailing myth in developed nations that
research and innovation will ultimately assist poorer countries, however the health issues
of the developing and LDCs are not necessarily paralleled with their richer cousins. For
some diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, cancer and diabetes, the advances made in the
developed world could assist in the developing and least-developed world. Sadly, where
virtually unheard of treatable diseases, such as leishmaniasis and Chagas disease afflict
thousands of people (Commission on IPR, 2002), research and innovation is minimal or
non-existent and relies on government and private (non-pharmaceutical) philanthropy.
This highlights the inequities in resources and opportunities for countries at different
stages of development.

In 2000 the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly with the mandate to reduce by the year 2015 the “dehumanising
conditions of extreme poverty” (Greenhill, 2002 p.2). Part of this mandate includes
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reducing by two-thirds the under five mortality rate, reducing by three-quarters the
maternal mortality rate and to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Patent
protection, especially if it involves increasing price and decreasing choice of
pharmaceuticals, has the potential to hamper efforts to improve public health and achieve
these goals.

Some provisions of the original TRIPS Agreement exposed unintended consequences of
a global IP regime. After lobbying by affected countries, the Doha Declaration affirmed
sovereign rights to protect public health and acknowledged inequities by altering the
special provisions of TRIPS relating to compulsory licensing and parallel importing.

We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics (Paragraph 1, Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health)4.
Therefore,
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health…[It] should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’
rights to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all (Paragraph 4 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health).
Accordingly,
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme emergency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
4

The original agreement restricted the scope of this paragraph to the three specified diseases. “Epidemics”
covers any health problem including those prevalent in developed as well as developing countries (Correa,
2002)
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malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency (Sub-paragraph 5 ( c) Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health).
Compulsory licenses allow for production of pharmaceuticals without the permission of
the patent holder and can be both a short and long-term measure (Correa, 2002).
Protection of public health through the issue of compulsory licenses is only a feasible
option if there are the manufacturing capabilities in that country sufficient to provide
generic drugs. There is a large disparity in the manufacturing capacities of developing
nations and the TRIPS Agreement (Article 31(f)) originally restricted manufacturing
under compulsory licenses to “predominately for the supply of the domestic market”. In
August 2003 this restriction was waived allowing countries with minimal or non existent
manufacturing capabilities to import drugs produced under compulsory license
elsewhere. Under this parallel importing regime, an ‘eligible importer’ may notify at any
time that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for example, only in the case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use (WTO, 2003).

However, invoking the compulsory licensing provisions is fraught with difficulties as
exemplified by the recent, well publicised South African experience. With an HIV/AIDS
epidemic and prohibitive drug pricing fuelling an inability to procure patented drugs,
alternative solutions were sought by the South African Government (Baskaran & Boden,
2005). The response from the pharmaceutical industry was to report South Africa to the
US Government and trade reprisals were threatened. The US also placed South Africa on
a watch list of countries that may be contravening TRIPS. There was also a caution from
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the UK and the European Union (Baskaran & Boden, 2005). Despite these pressures
South Africa moved forward and imported cheap generic HIV/AIDS medicines. This
prompted legal action by a group of 40 pharmaceutical companies supported by the South
African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association who argued the South African
Government were violating their patent rights by enacting a law to make medicines more
affordable. However, pressure from global criticism and the requirement to produce
documents relating to costs and pricing the pharmaceutical companies withdrew their
action (Mowjee, 2003).

Parallel importing, as a solution, relies on the existence of a market large enough for
production to be economically viable by an eligible exporter. Manufacture of generic
pharmaceuticals also relies on the existence of a drug to copy. Underscoring this issue is
the impact of IP regimes in developed countries that provide a powerful incentive to
research in the areas that affect only those in developed nations at the expense of global
health. Consider, however, the diseases which afflict the developing world where demand
is high but the ability to pay is low.
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Table 1: Sales by geographic area (PhRMA Member Companies 2002)

Geographic Region
Africa
U.S & Canada
Latin America
Asia-Pacific
Australia & New Zealand
Western Europe
Central & Eastern Europe
Middle East
Uncategorised

US$

Share

(in millions)

%

549.8
142,551.6
4,583.7
3,043.8
1,555.8
26,565.1
1,712.1
1,362.3
4,542.7

0.3
74.0
2.4
1.6
0.8
13.7
0.9
0.7
2.4

Source: PhRMA (2004) Profile Pharmaceutical Industry 2004: Focus on Innovation.

The table above clearly demonstrates the concentration in developed countries of ability
to pay for research based pharmaceutical products. Lack of market opportunities relegate
many diseases of the developing and least-developed nations a low commercial priority
(Kettler & Collins, 2002). These infectious and communicable diseases are known as
“neglected diseases” (Kettler & Collins, 2002, p.10). A study by Troiller et al (in Cohen,
2002) of 1,393 drugs approved in the period 1975 –1999 found that just over 1% were
specifically for tropical disease and tuberculosis. Research in neglected diseases has been
initiated through some public private partnerships e.g. Medicines for Malaria Venture
(MMV). Interestingly, the biggest change in funding for has come from foundations, such
as the Gates Foundation (Cohen, 2002). Another source of R&D is the non-profit
pharmaceutical company, One World Health, which procures dormant IP rights from
major, for-profit pharmaceutical companies and collaborates with various NGO groups to
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provide research and medicines. In return the pharmaceutical companies have
philanthropic exposure and as well as a tax write-off in the US (Rogers, 2003).

Recognising that the impact of IP regimes, as well as being country specific, are disease
specific, the public health issues fall into two broad categories – those diseases
specifically mentioned as epidemics in the Doha Declaration and those communicable
and infectious diseases unique to developing and least-developed nations, the neglected
diseases.

Epidemic Diseases
The three diseases specifically illustrative of an epidemic are HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis (TB). Interestingly these three diseases are common to the developed world
in some form and are already on the research and development agenda. In the case of
HIV/AIDS, it is the single biggest cause of mortality world-wide (IPR, Commission,
2002). TB, a virtually eradicated disease in the developed world, has made a resurgence
as a co-disease with HIV/AIDS and thus attracts research attention. Malaria, although
uncommon in the developed world, attracts research into prophylactic treatment for
travellers (Commission on IPR, 2002).

Malaria, as an example, kills approximately 1,222,000 people annually and 88% of those
are from Africa (WHO, 2003). Malarial control in endemic regions relies on diagnosis
and prompt treatment, otherwise the disease advances rapidly (TDR, 2004) Although
several drugs are available, the only treatment for many people is a medicine developed
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in 1934, Chioroquin, and the new strains of malaria are resistant to this older treatment.
Artemisinins, developed from traditional Chinese herbal medicines has proved an
effective treatment, however to avoid parasitic resistance a combination therapy is
recommended (Arrow, 2004). Although malaria is treatable using a combination of drugs,
the lack of a viable economic market to offset the cost of newer antimalarial drugs
prevents their use (Cohen, 2002).

Neglected Diseases
The term neglected diseases is used by health lobby groups to indicate a group of
diseases that attract little or no research and development, and in some cases, a cessation
of manufacture of drugs or vaccine. This term is highly emotive and the IFPMA has
contested the use of this term based on the fact that it lacks a clear and precise definition
for policy decisions (IFPMA, 2003). In 2001, in a joint study with WHO, the
pharmaceutical industry identified African trypanosomiasis, leisthmaniasis and Chagas
disease as truly neglected. These diseases are categorised as such because effective
treatment is not available. But there is another list, those diseases which have treatments
but for reasons of access and affordability are not available. This list includes leprosy,
onchocerciasis, lymphatic filariasis and schistosomiasis5 (Appendix 3). Measles, a
common disease not generally considered life threatening in developed countries, is also
considered worthy of attention in developing countries (Médecins Sans Frontières in
Commission on IPR, 2002).

5

Acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria also fall into this category, however,
the last three have already been discussed in the previous section.
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The lack of availability of medicines therefore rests to some extent with market failure
and to some extent public policy failure because of the political nature of governmental
research agenda (MSF, 2001). The context and conditions surrounding the advent of
disease cannot be understated, especially in terms of long term eradication.
Leishmaniasis, an example of a neglected disease, consists of a group of fatal parasitic
conditions related to environmental changes and degradation. The treatment, SSG, was
developed in 1930 and requires a one month hospital stay. For many, hospitalisation for a
month is impossible, the drug is expensive and resistance to the treatment is rising
(Cohen, 2002). Therefore, in addition to the general health implications, the disease
severely constrains productivity (TDR, 2004).

Notwithstanding the recognition that the health issues facing the developing world are a
combination of many factors including public policy and institutional frameworks, IPR
hamper efforts to improve public health in the following ways,

1. Research and development, unless philanthropic, is not commercially viable
where there is a limited market in terms of ability to pay for expensive under
patent medicines.
2. Where drugs or the market to encourage research and development exist, such as
for HIV/AIDS, cancer or diabetes, the drugs and vaccines are still unaffordable.
Even generic copies may be unaffordable for patients in LDC’s.
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3. Generic manufacturing, although providing a cheaper alternative is still market
driven and this practice will be further constrained by compulsory licensing and
parallel importing provisions after the full implementation of TRIPS post- 2016.

Accounting and Accountability
The commodification of knowledge serves to transfer the responsibility for health
outcomes to the market. A global IP regime therefore, assumes global health outcomes
will be achieved through economic globalisation. “Intellectual property rights are rule
governed privileges that regulate the ownership and exploitation of abstract
objects”(Drahos, 1996, p.5). In this conceptual form the privileges have the potential to
be “liberty intruding” (Drahos, 1996, p.5) by providing dangerous levels of private
power. When these rights are conferred on things of universal social importance and
become object related, the holder of these rights then has the power to mediate the
relationship between the object and the person, thus shifting the object-dependent
relationship to a person-dependent relationship (Drahos, 1996). And this,

[E]xtensive, possibly global power, will probably be concentrated in the
hands of those who through their sufficient scientific/technological
capabilities and superior capital resources, are able to capture, through the
property mechanism for abstract objects, resources upon which there is a
universal reliance (Drahos, 1996, p.161)
This abstraction, intellectual property, becomes both a source of capital and a source of
power. This power is demonstrated by the concentrated handful of pharmaceutical
companies that through patents receive the privilege of monopolistic profits. Accounting
is a mechanism through which power is exercised, rather than being a neutral technology
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to provide information, (Miller, 1994). The symbolic and ritualistic aspects of accounting
assist in justifying the agendas, methods and goals of organisations (Graham and Neu,
2003).

[A]ccounting technologies help structure the institutional field within which
the supra-national organizations operate, influencing their goals and
performance by shaping what is both thinkable and possible. In this way, these
organizations serve to propagate accounting technologies, but are
simultaneously constituted by them. …[A]ccounting and accountability
mechanisms create a particular form of social distinction. … This social
distinction is the asymmetry of wealth and power that exists across
international boundaries (Graham and Neu, 2003, pp. 451-2)
Patent protected monopolistic profits are presumed to be an incentive for innovation. This
‘means-end’ rationality is reoriented by the use of accounting techniques. The ex ante
expectation becomes an ex post legitimation for patent protection. The argument,
reoriented in this way, effectively situates the power of defining the forum and agenda to
the vested interests of the industry. The goal of profit maximisation gains primacy and
drives the argument. The argument, framed in terms of economic rationalism, is in effect
‘repackaged’ and becomes an ‘ends-means’ rationality. Accounting is not a neutral
device and is “an attempt to intervene, to act upon individuals, entities and processes to
transform them and to achieve specific ends…[to do so] accounting practices create the
costs and returns whose reality actors and agents are asked to respond to” (Miller, 1994,
p.1).

Accounting defines and constructs a ‘cost’. Accounting rules prescribe the “real-ization”
(Hines, 1988, p. 252) of this cost, which can be either expensed or capitalised and
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subsequently amortised or written down for impairment. Accounting also provides
organisations with the ability to ascribe a value to an abstraction, an intangible asset. The
accounting treatment for intangible assets, whether patents or R & D, affects accounting
profit calculation. This figure in the public domain is used as a measure of performance.
In a controversial industry, ‘performance’ attracts attention from policy-makers and
critics.

The difficulty in directly linking profitability and pharmaceutical R & D is exacerbated
by the complex structure of many research based pharmaceutical companies. Companies
that comprise this industry are also involved in many other related activities, including
veterinary products, medical supplies and nutritional products. This presents difficulties
in isolating particular costs and products. Adding to this opacity is the practice of
increasing R & D investments as profit opportunities expand, so supranormal profit
opportunities dissipate. Policy interventions aimed at reducing industry profits and prices
are subsequently preempted (Scherer, 2004). Despite the fact that accounting treatment
for patents and R & D varies, most western generally accepted accounting principles only
allow capitalisation of development costs once future economic benefits are ensured6.
The International Accounting Standard IAS38 Intangible Assets7 is clear that all costs
defined as research must be expensed.

6

Under the International Accounting Standards (IAS 38), the treatment of R&D will be harmonised
amongst countries adopting these new standards. However, the majority of the leading pharmaceutical
companies (see Appendix 2) are domiciled in the US. The US has, as yet, made no firm commitment to
adopt International Accounting Standards.
7
Interestingly, the accounting regime under International Accounting Standards will be harmonised and
the TRIPS Agreement is a push for harmonisation of legal regimes covering intellectual property. The
International Accounting Standards Board is also no stranger to corporate lobbying, for example IAS 39.
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Development costs may be capitalised if certain criteria are met. For the pharmaceutical
industry where the development component accounts for approximately 70% of the total
R&D budget (IFPMA, 2004) this accounting treatment is significant. These criteria
include the ability to demonstrate the use or sale of the resulting asset and specific
identification of future benefits including a market (Oxley, 2004). Marketing or
regulatory approval (see below Phase IV) is considered an indication of satisfying the
five accounting recognition criteria (Friend et al, 2004). Product development, besides
being a large cost component, is also time-consuming. Different phases of development
also exhibit different risk profiles in terms of expected success. The US system is the
most rigorous and is outlined below.
Table 2: Development stages required by FDA
STAGE
Preclinical Testing
Investigational New
Drug Application
(IND)
Clinical Trials
Phase 1
Phase II
Phase III
New Drug Application
(NDA)
Phase IV

PROCESS
Laboratory and animal studies
Permission to test in people

TIME (yrs)
3.5

Test on 20-80 normal healthy volunteers
100 -300 volunteers affected by disease
1,000 – 3,000 patients in clinics and hospitals

1
2
3
2 (average)

Evaluate long-term effects

Source: Drug Discovery, Development and Approval Process8

The development process will differ between drugs and also across markets. To assess
market viability at any stage requires an assessment of risks and the probability of

8

www.fdareview.org/approval_process.shtml
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benefits. The contestability of this assessment is highlighted by the fact that Phase IV
clinical trial expenditure is arguably a marketing cost (Oxley, 2004). The accounting
treatment for purchased R&D and patents differs from internally generated research. An
intangible asset is deemed to be created under IAS38 because the criteria for
capitalisation is presumed to be satisfied since development risk is factored into the
purchase price. The recent scale and number of mergers, acquisitions and collaborations
in the research based pharmaceutical industry results in a significant accounting issue
regarding intangible assets and subsequent amortisation or impairment (Friend et al,
2004).

Internal cost calculations for research and development are used to justify patent
protection. These calculations are based on estimates and opportunity costs (Di Masi et
al, 2003) and also ignore the contribution of government funded research and tax
incentives. The shifting of marketing expenditure into the development phase further
distorts the cost. The information used for the calculation of the average figure of
US$802 million is not publicly available and requires many estimates compounded by the
use of valuation techniques requiring further estimation, such as discount rates.
Therefore, of the quoted US$802 million only half is a true cash cost (Bonduelle &
Pisani, 2004).

Also, the sample for calculating the average cost is based on the

development of treatments for chronic and degenerative diseases, which are more
expensive to test (DiMasi et al, 2003).

[T]his matter could be resolved simply, if the drug companies were to open
their books and reveal their actual investments in research and development

25

(R&D). Implausibly they claim that this information would give away trade
secrets and must remain proprietary – though when it suits their political
agenda, they make all sorts of announcements about costs (Anon.,2002, p.5).

Accounting systems provide a mechanism through which power is exercised and
highlight issues of social welfare and distribution (Miller, 1994). R&D costs influence
international and national resource allocation and provide inputs into public policy
studies and decision-making (DiMasi et al, 2003). In turn, actors in the research based
pharmaceutical industry locate their decisions and rhetoric within an accounting
discourse. As an example, profitability studies have attempted to demonstrate that
supranormal profits are not sustained in the pharmaceutical industry (DiMasi et al, 2003;
Scherer, 2001). Pharmaceutical firms exploit profit opportunities by investing further in
R&D and promotional activity to reduce returns to deflect scrutiny or policy interventions
aimed at reducing profits or pricing (Scherer, 2001).

“[Accounting] deflects attention away from contradictions and tensions that
would otherwise translate into social conflict and change by reducing the
matter of business ethics to cases of individual corruption. And it presents as
universal the partisan interests of corporations, by masking the frequent
incompatibility of social and corporate interests under a rhetorical gloss that
allows the comfortable cohabitation of social responsibility and corporate
profitability” (Neimark, 1995, p. 88).
Financial accounting is underpinned by neo-classical economics. The notion of the
market having the responsibility for pharmaceutical innovation rests on the assumption
that this public good will satisfy the needs and issues of health in a global environment.
This public good has become a private good facilitated by the TRIPS Agreement and free
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market rationality is failing, particularly in relation to health crises in LDCs as is so often
the case, when the economic system “pits profits against people” (Neimark, 1995, p.81).
This is demonstrated so overwhelmingly by the case in South Africa where financial
accounting pressures were central to the case made by drug companies (Baskaran &
Boden, 2005; Mowjee, 2003).

“The foundational assumption of classical and neo-classical economics, that
self-interested behaviour combined with market competition will adequately
protect the public interest, seems less and less tenable at the very moment that
free market economics is emerging as the unchallenged international
orthodoxy” (Neimark, 1995, p. 83).
Private ownership of knowledge provides the pharmaceutical industry with the power to
mediate relationships between R&D and health outcomes. Where this mediation role is
conferred to a profit seeking entity, accountable to the interests of private capital, then the
public health issues have the potential to be subverted to economic rationality. Under the
TRIPS Agreement, the role of mediator is expanded to include global public health issues
which are located within an economic incentive framework. Knowledge, as a public
good, ultimately becomes shareholder gain by commodification – the gateway to capital
(Drahos, 1996).

Conclusion
Pharmaceutical firm profits have frequently been in the spotlight (Meyer et al, 2000). The
pharmaceutical industry in the US often top the Fortune 500 rankings for profitability and
most research based pharmaceutical companies devote more revenue to profits than to
R&D (Public Citizen, 2002).
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The TRIPS Agreement grants the rights to monopolistic profits as an incentive for the
creation of knowledge. As a global agreement on patented pharmaceuticals, extends the
obligation to global welfare including improved health outcomes. The abstract notion of
property rights is commodified through accounting discourse. Accounting plays a
legitimating role in the economic justification for product prices, not to mention a
rhetorical role in identifying, measuring and valuing IPR. It also plays an ideological role
as a gateway to capital (Drahos, 1996). Accounting, because of the centrality of notions
such as ‘costs’ in trade-resolution mechanisms, “operates as an embedded technology to
adjudicate and apportion the spoils of such disputes” (Graham and Neu, 2003). This
perspective, that of the primacy of capital interests, supports market based solutions to
social problems.

Inasmuch as accounting discourse and the research based pharmaceutical industry are
unable to solve global health problems, it is clear that practitioners and policymakers
should consider the complicity of accounting in an increasingly unjust world (Tinker and
Gray, 2003). This consideration should involve a critique of global agreements that
reinforce, echo and amplify the power and interests of capital providers and attempt to
provide market based solutions to promote the public interest.
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Appendix 1: Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies 2003
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Appendix 2: Top 12 Pharmaceutical Companies R&D Expenditure 2003
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Appendix 3: Burden of disease in DALY’s* by cause and mortality stratum
in WHO regions
Disease

Total

Africa

Americas

Eastern
Meditteranean

Europe

(,000)

(,000)

(,000)

(,000)

(,000)

South East
Asia
(,000)

Western
Pacific
(,000)

Tuberculosis

35 361

8 230

902

2 876

1 653

15 729

5 948

HIV/AIDS

86 072

66 772

3 220

1 600

1 620

10 834

1 965

Malaria

44 716

39 165

110

2 204

19

2 755

433

1 535

1 494

0

39

0

0

0

2 090

383

44

248

6

1 358

50

Chagas disease

667

0

662

0

0

0

0

Leprosy

199

23

18

25

0

118

13

Onchocerciasis

484

470

2

10

0

0

0

Lymphatic
filariasis
Schistosomiasis

5 777

2 011

10

122

1

3 219

411

1 702

1 334

74

227

1

7

55

27 058

15 567

0

2 988

257

7 060

1 170

African
trypanosomiasis
Leisthmaniasis

Measles

Source: World Health Report 2003 Annex Table 3 Burden of Disease in DALY’s by
cause, sex and mortality stratum in WHO regions, estimated for 2002.

*DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Year ) is a summary measure of population health used
to represent the health of a population in terms of mortality and non-fatal outcomes in a
single figure e.g. if a person dies with a disability (weighted at 0.2) dies at age 60 (life
expectancy =80) the burden of the disease would be 20 DALY + (60X 0.2) DALY = 32
DALY (Nord, 1999)

34

